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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040879-CA

v.
BECKY LYNNE DRAPER,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals the trial court's interlocutory order denying her motion to declare
Utah's child endangerment statute unconstitutional and to quash the bindover. Under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (West 2004), this Court has jurisdiction over all interlocutory
appeals from second and third degree felonies.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Is Utah's child endangerment statute, which proscribes exposing a child
to, or causing a child to ingest, a controlled substance, unconstitutionally vague as applied
to defendant's conduct—i.e., breast-feeding her four-month-old baby after smoking
marijuana?
Standard of Review: Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of law,
which are reviewed for correctness. State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, \ 42,99 P.3d 820. Whether

the district court properly interpreted a statute is also a question of law, reviewed for
correctness. State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ^ 8, 84 P.3d 1171.
Issue No, 2: Is there probable cause to believe that defendant exposed or caused her
four-month-old baby to ingest a controlled substance, where she smoked marijuana and then
breast-fed her baby?
Standard of Review: Whether to bind a criminal defendant over for trial is a question
of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 8, 20 P.3d 300.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann, § 76-5-112.5. Endangerment of child or elder adult.
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) "Chemical substance" means a substance intended to be used as a
precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or any other chemical
intended to be used in the manufacture of a controlled substance. Intent under
this subsection may be demonstrated by the substance's use, quantity, manner
of storage, or proximity to other precursors, or to manufacturing equipment.
(b) "Child" means the same as that term is defined in Subsection 76-5109(l)(a).
(c) "Controlled substance" means the same as that term is defined in
Section 58-37-2.
(d) "Drug paraphernalia" means the same as that term is defined in
Section 58-37a-3.
(e) "Elder adult" means the same as that term is defined in Section 765-111.
(2) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who
knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be
exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance,
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1), is
guilty of a felony of the third degree.
(3) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who
violates Subsection (2), and a child or elder adult actually suffers bodily injury,
2

substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury by exposure to, ingestion of,
inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or
drug paraphernalia, is guilty of a felony of the second degree unless the
exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact result in the death of the child or
elder adult, in which case the person is guilty of a felony of the first degree.
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a violation of this section that the
controlled substance was provided by lawful prescription for the child or elder
adult, and that it was administered to the child or elder adult in accordance
with the prescription instructions provided with the controlled substance.
(b) As used in this Subsection (4), "prescription" has the same definition as
in Section 58-37-2.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Defendant, Becky Lynne Draper, was charged with one count of child endangerment,
a third degree felony, in violation ofUtah Code Ann. §76-5-112.5 (West 2004). Rl. After
the preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound defendant over based on evidence that she
smoked marijuana and then nursed her baby. R66-67.
Defendant moved to quash the bindover and to declare Utah's child endangerment
statute (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5) unconstitutional. R29-87. After full briefing and a
hearing, the trial court issued a memorandum decision denying defendant's motion. R13240, 159-69, 180. (A copy of the trial court's memorandum decision is attached in
Addendum A).
!

The record on appeal includes a transcript volume entitled "Preliminary Hearing."
See R179. That volume, however, is not a transcript of the preliminary hearing in this
case. Rather, it is of a preliminary hearing held in another related prosecution of
defendant. The only transcript of the preliminary hearing in this case is an unofficial one
prepared by the Legal Defender's Association. The unofficial transcript is contained in
the pleadings volume. This is the transcript that the defendant relies on in her brief. For
purposes of this interlocutory appeal only, the State does not object to using this
unofficial transcript.
3

This Court granted defendant's petition for interlocutory review on November 4,
2004.2 R171.
STATEMENT OF FACTS3
Defendant breast-feeds her infant son, who was born on September 8,2003. R47,55,
5 8. Defendant has admitted to smoking marijuana twice since her baby's birth: once on New
Year's Day 2004, and again on January 9, just after police had finished searching her home
for drugs. R58.
Search warrant
On January 9, 2004, officers executed a search warrant at defendant's home. R46.
Present during the search were defendant, her then four-month-old baby, and a houseguest
named Jessica Hironas. Id. Jimmy Draper, defendant's husband, was away from home at
the time. R46, 52, 58.
After defendant waived her Miranda rights, Officer John Wester interviewed her.
R49. Defendant told Officer Wester that Jimmy had been selling marijuana for the past yearand-a-half and that he made about $800 a month from his drug sales. Id. Defendant,
however, did not tell Officer Wester about her own drug use. Id.

2

Five days later, this Court also granted interlocutory review in State v. Nieberger,
Case No. 20040907-CA, which raises the same issues, but under different facts. Both
cases are on the same briefing schedule.
3

The State recites the evidence at the preliminary hearing "in a light most favorable
to the prosecution and resolve[s] all inferences in favor of the prosecution." State v.
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995). Defendant is presumed innocent until proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
4

During the search, officers found items used to both consume and distribute
marijuana.

R48. Those items included: scales, bongs, pipes, sandwich baggies for

packaging, and two individually packaged bags of marijuana—one weighing 9.9 grams and
the other 8.7 grams. R48, 51. All of these items were found in a basement room, which
contained a loveseat, coffee table, and space heater. R48. Officers also found money in a
dresser drawer in defendant's bedroom, which defendant explained was "probably from drug
sales." R49.
Unannounced visit
About two weeks later, on January 20, 2004, Karen Barnes, an investigator with the
Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS"), arrived at defendant's home unannounced.
R56-57. Barnes told defendant that she was investigating child endangerment, based on
allegations that marijuana had been found in the home. R57. At this point, defendant again
stated that Jimmy had been selling marijuana for the past year-and-a-half to support his drug
habit, and that he abused drugs daily. R58. Barnes asked defendant if she was abusing
drugs. R58. Defendant admitted to smoking marijuana twice since her baby's birth: once
on New Year's Day 2004, and again on January 9, after the officers had executed the search
warrant at her home. Id.
During Barnes's visit, defendant began breast-feeding her baby. R58. This prompted
Barnes to talk to defendant about the danger of using drugs and how drugs can travel through
breast milk and be ingested by the baby. Id. Defendant claimed she was unaware of the
danger and promised to stop using drugs. R60.
5

Barnes also warned defendant that all of the drugs and paraphernalia needed to be out
of the house, and that police would continue to "watch the home." R58. Defendant "thought
Jimmy . . . had taken everything out of the home," but promised that "if he had not she was
going to follow-up on that." Id.
The magistrate bound defendant over on child endangerment because defendant, a
breast-feeding mother, had admitted to using marijuana. R66. This, the magistrate found,
supported a reasonable belief that defendant had "exposed" or caused her baby to "ingest"
illegal drugs. R66-67. The magistrate, however, was unwilling to find probable cause that
defendant had "exposed" her baby to drugs merely because officers had found marijuana and
paraphernalia in the basement. Id. The magistrate concluded no evidence showed "that the
child was actually exposed to [the drugs and paraphernalia in the basement] in the sense of
being taken down there in the presence of any of the drugs or paraphernalia that were
available there." R66.
The district court likewise concluded that the State had presented sufficient evidence
to support probable cause that defendant had violated the child endangerment statute by
"knowingly or intentionally caus[ing] her child to ingest or be exposed to a controlled
substance, chemical substance or drug paraphernalia." R168. Like the magistrate, the
district court based its ruling only on the fact that "[defendant was using drugs prior to
nursing her child." Id.

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I:

Defendant argues that Utah's child endangerment statute is

unconstitutionally vague both because it does not give fair warning of what is prohibited to
persons of ordinary intelligence, and it creates a risk of arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement. Defendant does not have standing to facially challenge the child endangerment
statute for vagueness because she has not alleged or shown that the statute implicates any
First Amendment freedom. Defendant, therefore, is limited to challenging the statute as
vague only as applied to her conduct.
Defendant argues that the statutory term "exposed to" is vague because it is undefined.
She also claims that the terms "exposed to" and "ingest" are rendered unconstitutionally
vague because the statute does not require a showing of danger or a substantial risk of harm.
The term "exposed to" is not vague. Its common ordinary meaning is "to lay open," "to leave
unprotected," or "to make accessible or subject" to. Read in the context of the statute, the
term "exposed to" is sufficiently clear to place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that
the statute prohibits defendant's conduct—smoking marijuana and breast-feeding a baby.
Moreover, neither "exposed to" nor "ingest" is rendered vague by the Legislature's decision
to not require a showing of danger or risk of harm.
Point II: Defendant alternatively argues that the State failed to present sufficient
evidence at the preliminary hearing to show that she intentionally or knowingly allowed her
baby to be exposed to or to ingest marijuana. At the preliminary hearing stage, the
prosecution was required to present sufficient evidence to support only a reasonable belief
7

that defendant knowingly or intentionally caused or permitted her baby to be exposed to or
to ingest a controlled substance. Here, defendant admitted using marijuana on January 1,
2004 and January 9, 2004. Two weeks later, on January 20, a DCFS caseworker saw
defendant breast-feeding her four-month-old baby. The magistrate and district court drew
the reasonable inference that if defendant was breast-feeding her baby on January 20, she
also breast-fed her baby two and three weeks earlier when she smoked marijuana. The
magistrate and district court also reasonably inferred that defendant was aware that what she
ingested would be passed on to the baby, despite her self-serving claim that she did not
know.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TERM "EXPOSED TO" IN UTAH'S CHILD ENDANGERMENT
STATUTE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED
TO DEFENDANT BECAUSE HER CONDUCT FELL WELL WITHIN
THE ORDINARY AND COMMONLY-UNDERSTOOD MEANING OF
THAT TERM
Defendant was charged under subsection (2) of Utah's child or elder adult
endangerment statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2) (West 2004). That subsection
makes it a third degree felony for any person to "knowingly or intentionally cause[] or
permit[] a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with
a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection
(1)." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2).

8

Defendant argues that the child endangerment statute is "unconstitutionally vague
since it fails to give notice that having marijuana and paraphernalia out of reach in a house
where an infant resides or that nursing a child at some point after using marijuana is
prohibited conduct." Br. Aplt. 9. Specifically, defendant contends that the term "exposed
to" is ambiguous and undefined in the statute. Br. Aplt. 21. Defendant asserts that the
statute does not give fair warning of what is prohibited because it does not "specify the
limitations of the term 'exposed to'" and it does not "require danger or a substantial risk of
harm" for either "exposing" or "ingesting." Br. Aplt. 21, 25. She further asserts that the
resulting vagueness in the statute creates a risk of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.
Br. Aplt. 9-15, 21, 26-31.
To the extent that defendant mounts a facial challenge to the child endangerment
statute, she does not have standing to do so. This is because she has not alleged, much less
shown, that the statute implicates any First Amendment freedom. Defendant is therefore
limited to challenging the statute as vague as applied only to her conduct. Moreover, because
the magistrate bound defendant over only on the theory that she breast-fed her baby after
smoking marijuana, that is the only conduct at issue here. The State, therefore, will not be
responding to defendant's claim that the child endangerment statute is unconstitutionally
vague as applied to her conduct in keeping marijuana and paraphernalia in the basement. As
explained below, defendant has not shown that the statute is vague as applied to her because,
read in context, the terms "exposed to" and "ingest" are sufficiently clear to place a person

9

of ordinary intelligence on notice that the statute prohibits smoking marijuana and then
breast-feeding a baby.
A.

Defendant may not complain of the vagueness of a law as applied to the
hypothetical conduct of others.
Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a criminal statute must define the offense

"' with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited
and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" State
v. Green, 2004 UT 76, \ 43, 99 P.3d 820 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357
(1983)). A statute need not define an offense with "mathematical certainty," however.
Graynedv. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104,110 (1972). Statutes may use terms "marked by
'flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather than meticulous specificity,'" as long as " it is clear
what the ordinance as a whole prohibits." Id. (quoting Esteban v. Central Missouri State
College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 1969)).
Vagueness challenges "'which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be
examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.'" Green, 2004 UT 76, If 44 (quoting
Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 n.7
(1982)). Absent a First Amendment violation, "a court will uphold a facial vagueness
challenge 'only if the [statute] is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.'" State v.
MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, \ 12, 84 P.3d 1171 (emphasis added). "A statute that is clear as
applied to a particular complainant cannot be considered impermissibly vague in all of its
applications and thus will necessarily survive a facial vagueness challenge." Id. Thus, "a
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court should 'examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical
applications of the law' when a challenged statute 'implicates no constitutionally protected
conduct.'" Green, 2004 UT 76, % 44 (quoting Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 494-95).
Here, defendant's conduct—smoking marijuana and then breast-feeding her
baby—does not involve a constitutionally protect right. Therefore, "[defendant must show
that [the statute] 'is impermissibly vague in all of its applications,'"starting with the instant
case. State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, f 12, 97 P.3d 732 (quoting Hoffman, 455 U.S. at
494-95), cert granted, 106 P.3d 743.
To prevail on her vague-as-applied challenge, defendant must show "either (1) that
the statute[] do[es] not provide 'the kind of notice that enables ordinary people to understand
what conduct [is prohibited],' or (2) that the statute[] 'encourage[s] arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.'"MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, If 13 (citations omitted). As explained
below, defendant has shown neither.
B.

As used in the child endangerment statute, the term "expose to" is sufficiently
definite to put defendant on notice that her conduct was prohibited.
As stated, the statute here prohibits a person from intentionally or knowingly causing

or permitting a child "to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a
controlled substance . . . or drug paraphernalia." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2).
Defendant first attacks the term "exposed to." She contends that because "exposed to" is not
defined in the statute, and because the term "encompass [es] a broad spectrum of actions," the
term is ambiguous and did not give notice that her conduct was unlawful. Br. Aplt. 21, 25.

11

A statute, however, is not ambiguous or unconstitutionally vague merely because it
does not define a statutory term. See State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277, 278 (Utah App.
1995) (observing that although "representation" was subject to multiple meanings, in the
context of the statute in which it was used, it was not ambiguous); State v. Owens, 638 P.2d
1182, 1184 (Utah 1981) (upholding statute where "gross deviation" not defined); State v.
Krueger, 1999 UT App 54, f 14, 975 P.2d 489 (upholding statute where "delinquent" not
defined); Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259,1265 (Utah App. 1997) (holding statute not
unconstitutionally vague for failing to define "emotional distress"). Nor is a statute
unconstitutionally vague merely because it is broad. See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,
966 (Utah 1989) ("a statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it is broad"). Rather, the
"essential test is whether the statute imparts fair notice of what conduct is prohibited." Id
A statute places a person on notice if it is "sufficiently clear to convey 'warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.'" State v.
Morrison, 2001 UT 73, \ 14, 31 P.3d 547 (quoting State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1285
(Utah 1983) (additional citations and quotation marks omitted)).
1.

In the context of the child endangerment statute, "expose to" means "to
lay open," "leave unprotected," or "to make accessible or subject to."

Although not defined in the statute, "expose to" does have "a common understanding
that is sufficient to put people on warning as to what conduct is prohibited by the statute."
Morrison, 2001 UT 73, \ 15. The dictionary defines "expose" as
la: to lay open (as to attack, danger, trial or test): make accessible to
something that may prove detrimental: deprive of shelter, protection, or care;
12

b: to submit or subject to an action or influence <e.g., children to good books>;
specif: to subject (a sensitive photographic film, plate, or paper) to the action
of radiant energy; c: to abandon (an infant) esp. by leaving in the open:... 2:
to lay open to view: lay bare: make known: set forth: exhibit, display; b: to
exhibit for public veneration.
Webster }s Third New International Dictionary 802 (1993). See also Webster's New World
Dictionary 501 (4th ed. 2003), as quoted by defendant, Br. Aplt. 22.4
The district court relied on the dictionary definition to conclude that "exposed" was
unambiguous. R165. The court then applied "the common sense, ordinary and accepted
meaning of the term 'exposed,'" to the facts of this case. Id. The district court noted that
defendant "was nursing her child and was an admitted drug user." Id. The district court
concluded that this gave rise to a reasonable inference that "defendant was using drugs prior
to nursing her child." Id. Based on these facts and inferences, the district court further
concluded that there was probable cause to believe that defendant "knowingly or
intentionally caused her child to ingest or be exposed to a controlled substance, chemical
substance, or drug paraphernalia."5 R168. In other words, the district court found probable
4

The trial court resorted to a different dictionary for its definition of "expose," but
with the same results:
La. To remove shelter or protection from; b. To lay open, as to something
undesirable or injurious. 2. To subject (e.g., a photographic film to the
action of light. 3. To make visible . .. 4.a. To make known (e.g., a crime);
b. To reveal the guilt or wrongdoing of. 5. To abandon or put out without
shelter or food.
R165 (quoting Random House Webster's Dictionary 250 (4th ed. 2001).
5

Unlike the magistrate, the district court also found that the baby was "exposed to"
the packaged marijuana, bongs, and pipes in the basement because they "lay open or were
visible and the child was not protected from them." R165. As stated, however, the
magistrate did not bind over on this theory and the State has not appealed nor otherwise
13

cause to believe that defendant committed child endangerment because she "subjected" or
"exposed" her baby to illegal drugs through her breast milk.
Defendant essentially agrees that the definition of "expose" adopted by the trial court
is the one most applicable to the child endangerment statute:
The statute requires that an adult allow a child "to be exposed to" a substance
or paraphernalia; in other words the language of the statute requires exposure
of the child to the substance or paraphernalia and not that the substance or
paraphernalia be exposed to the child. That wording suggests that the first
definition of "expose" found in Webster's Dictionary, "to lay open (to danger,
attack, ridicule, etc.); leave unprotected or to make accessible or subject (to an
influence or action): is the definition applicable to the child endangerment
statute.
Br. Aplt. 22-23 (emphasis added). Thus, like the trial court, defendant reasons that "a child
who is laid open to or subjected to danger from a controlled substance or paraphernalia has
been 'exposed to' an item within the meaning of the statute." Br. Aplt. 23. As explained,
the baby here was "exposed to" or "subjected to" marijuana through his mother's breast milk.
2.

The term "expose to" is not rendered vague or ambiguous merely because
it has multiple meanings.

Defendant nevertheless asserts that because "expose" has "many different meanings
and applications" it "does not have a commonly understood and accepted meaning." Br.
Aplt. 22. This, defendant claims, further renders that term ambiguous. Id.
The fact that "expose" has more than one definition does not render that term either
ambiguous or vague. This is because statutory terms are not "construed in a vacuum." State

challenged that ruling. This part of the district court's ruling, therefore, is not at issue
here.
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v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, f 13, 97 P.3d 732. See also Bowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50,
\ 8, 94 P.3d 915 ("[s]ubsections of a statute should not be construed in a vacuum but must
be read as part of the statute as a whole"). Rather, statutory terms must be construed
according to their context and "as [they] relate[] to the other terms within the . . . statute."
Norris, 2004 UT App 267, \ 13. See also State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992,994 (Utah App. 1993)
("[C]ourts typically construe statutes on the assumption that 'each term is used advisedly and
that the intent of the Legislature is revealed in the use of the term in the context and structure
in which it is placed"')

(quoting Ward v. Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984)

(emphasis in original); State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277, 278 (Utah App. 1995) (holding
that even though term "representation" outside the context of the statute is "subject to
multiple meanings," the term is not ambiguous "within the context of the statute").
As defendant herself acknowledges, when "expose to" is placed in the context of the
child endangerment statute, it is apparent that the first definition of "expose" applies: "to lay
open (to danger, attack, ridicule, etc.); leave unprotected or to make accessible or subject (to
an influence or action)." Br. Aplt. 23. As stated, this is the definition that the trial court
adopted and applied to this case. R65. The baby was "subjected to" the influence of a
controlled substance when his mother smoked marijuana and then breast-fed him. This falls
within the meaning of "expose to" as even defendant understands that term. See Br. Aplt.
22-23.
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3.

The Legislature has legitimately determined that "exposing" children to
illegal drugs and paraphernalia creates a significant risk of harm.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendant argues that the child endangerment statute
is rendered vague because "the statute does not contain any language that limits the
application of the statute to the circumstances where the 'exposure' or 'ingestion' creates
actual danger or at least a significant risk of harm to the child." Br. Aplt. 25. Defendant
claims that this omission renders the statute vague because it does not give her "fair notice"
that "nursing her infant" after smoking marijuana "would subject her to prosecution for
endangering [her] child." Br. Aplt. 25.
It is true that the plain language of the statute unambiguously prohibits permitting
children to be exposed to or to ingest illegal drugs, irrespective of whether any actual or
potential risk of harm exists. This is because the Legislature has already determined that a
substantial risk of harm is inherent in the exposure or ingestion itself. As explained below,
this express legislative choice does not render "expose to" or "ingest" either vague or
ambiguous. To the contrary, it places all persons of ordinary intelligence on notice that
exposing children to drugs or paraphernalia, without more, violates the statute.
The Legislature intentionally omitted any requirement that exposure to contraband
create a substantial risk of harm. The structure of the statute confirms that the Legislature
intended to prohibit exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact, without more. Subsection
(2) simply provides that an adult is guilty of a third degree felony if she "knowingly or
intentionally" causes or permits a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale,
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or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as
defined in Subsection (1)." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2). As defendant correctly notes,
nothing in this subsection requires that any exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact
actually create a substantial risk of harm or cause harm. Br. Aplt. 25.
But while subsection (2) requires no showing of a risk or actual harm, subsection (3)
does. Subsection (3) enhances the penalty to a second degree felony if a child "suffers bodily
injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury by exposure to, ingestion or,
inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug
paraphernalia." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(3). That subsection further enhances the
penalty to a first degree felony if the exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact results in
death. Id. In the face of subsection (2)'s omission, subsection (3)'s enhancements serve as
compelling evidence that the Legislature did not intend to require that mere exposure "create
a substantial risk of harm."
That intent is supported by the statute's legislative history. Before 2002, the child
endangerment statute expressly prohibited placing a child "at risk of suffering bodily injury,
substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury from exposure to, ingestion of, inhalation
o f contraband. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2) (2000) (emphasis added). See also 2002
I
Laws of tJtah, ch. 32. In 2002, the Legislature struck the language requiring a showing that
the child was "at risk of suffering bodily injury." Id. It replaced that language with the
current subsection (2), which requires only a showing of exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or
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contact, and with the current subsection (3), which enhances the penalty if actual harm
results.
Defendant relies on the floor debates on the 2002 amendment to argue that deleting
the "at risk" language "demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend for the statute to be
broadly applied to circumstances such as these where parents have marijuana and
paraphernalia out of reach in their home where an infant resides, or when a mother breast
feeds her baby at some point after using marijuana." Br. Aplt. 18. Ordinarily, a court should
not resort to legislative history when, as here, the statute is unambiguous. See Lovendahl v.
Jordan SchoolDist, 2002 UT 130, \ 58,63 P.3d 705 (Durrant, J., concurring and dissenting
with two justices concurring); see also Okeefe v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 956 P.2d 279,
281 (Utah 1998) (the term "overtime" is clear and unambiguous and the court has "no need
to resort to other methods of construction"); Visitor Info. Cntr. Auth. v. Customer Service
Div., 930 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1997) ("Unless the statute on its face is unclear or
ambiguous, we find no need to delve into the uncertain facts of legislative history"); Salt
Lake Child &Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995)
("When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and
no room is left for construction"). But in this case, contrary to defendant's assertions, the
floor debates demonstrate that the Legislature did indeed intend to broaden the reach of the
child endangerment statute.
In introducing the 2002 amendment to the House, Representative Beck explained that
instead of requiring a showing of "risk" to children or elder adults, the original statute
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"should have simply made it illegal to expose them to a non-prescribed controlled
substance." R80. Representative Beck elaborated: "Obviously they have already determined
that the controlled substances are risky to an individual's health, otherwise they would not
be a controlled substance. The same is true with the drug paraphernalia and chemicals used
to making illegal drugs" Id, Representative Beck further explained that the "current
language unintentionally requires the prosecutor to present scientific evidence to show that
the controlled substances are dangerous." Id, That, the representative continued, is "not only
expensive but it's also ridiculous to spend all their time trying to show that." Id,
Senator Julander expressed similar concerns about the "at risk" language when
presenting the amendment to the Senate. "Obviously," she explained, "we've already
determined that controlled substances are risky to an individual's health." Recording of the
Proceedings of the 54th Legislature, Senate Floor Debates of H.B. 125, Day 40, March 1,
2002, Tape 46 (transcribed by Adrienne Nakamura, secretary, Utah Attorney General's
Office) (attached at Addendum B).6 Thus, she stated, the "current language unintentionally
requires a prosecutor to present specific evidence to show that controlled substances are
dangerous." Id. (Emphasis added). Senator Valentine initially objected to the amendment
because he believed that dropping the "at risk" language would criminalize the innocent
possession of two or more precursors in a house where children were present. Id. Senator

6

Defendant attached transcripts of the House floor debates on the amendment to
her memoranda below and to her opening brief. She has not, however, provided a
transcript of the Senate floor debate on the 2002 amendment. For the Court's
convenience, the State has supplied a copy of that debate at Addendum B.
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Valentine's concern was resolved, however, not by leaving the "at risk" language in, but by
requiring that possession of any precursors be with the intent to manufacture illegal drugs.
Recording of the Proceedings of the 54th Legislature, Senate Floor Debates of H.B. 125, Day
43, March 4, 2002, Tape 49 (transcribed by Adrienne Nakamura, secretary, Utah Attorney
General's Office) (attached at Addendum B). See also 2002 Law of Utah, ch. 32.
In sum, the child endangerment statute unambiguously requires a showing that an
adult permitted a child to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with illegal
drugs or paraphernalia. Nothing in the plain language requires that the State also prove that
such exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact creates a significant risk or harm. Indeed,
as shown by the 2002 amendment and the supporting floor debates, the Legislature
consciously chose to drop that requirement. Thus, notwithstanding defendant's claims, the
Legislature did intend that "expose to" and "ingest" would reach a broader spectrum of
conduct than it previously had.
Eliminating the "at risk" language did not render "expose to" or "ingest"
unconstitutionally vague. As stated, defendant argues that "expose to" and "ingest" is
unconstitutionally vague unless the statute also requires a substantial risk of harm. Br. Aplt.
14-15,21,25-28. To support this claim, defendant relies on two out-of-state decisions, State
v. Downey, 476 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. 1985) and Commonwealth v. Carter, 462 S.E.2d 582 (Va.
Ct. App. 1995). Id. Neither case is helpful, however, because both construed statutes
completely different from the one at issue here.
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The statute in Downey prohibited a "person having the care, custody or control of a
dependent" from "knowingly or intentionally [placing] the dependent in a situation that may
endanger his life or health." Downey, 476 N.E.2d at 122. The Downey court held that the
statute, construed literally, criminalized exposing a dependent "to the risk of a risk of harm."
Id. at 123. Thus, "it would be a crime to raise a child in a high-rise apartment or to mop the
kitchen floor with a bucket of water in the presence of a small child." Id. This literal
construction, the Downey court said, had "a broadness and vagueness which would prevent
it from meeting constitutional muster." Id. To avoid this constitutional infirmity, Downey
read the statute to require that the "placement must itself expose the dependent in a danger
which is actual and appreciable." Id.
Carter interpreted a similar statute. That statute prohibited a child's custodian from
"willfully or negligently" permitting the child "to be placed in a situation that its life, health
or morals may be endangered

" Carter, 462 S.E.2d at 584 (emphasis added). The Carter

court concluded that "[b]y using the term 'may,' the legislature criminalize[d] any act which
presented] a 'possibility' of physical or moral harm to the child." Id. at 585. Accordingly,
Carter found this provision of the statute unconstitutionally vague. Id. (Citation omitted).
The statutes in Downey and Carter were not, as defendant suggests, unconstitutionally
vague because they did not require a significant risk of harm. Br. Aplt. 25-28. They were
unconstitutionally vague because a person of ordinary intelligence would be unable to tell
what risk of harm she must avoid.
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In contrast, Utah's child endangerment statute specifies the harm it seeks to prevent:
permitting children to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with illegal drugs
or paraphernalia. No one is left to guess what risk of harm must be avoided. Rather, the
statute spells it out: adults must not intentionally or knowingly expose their children to illegal
drugs or paraphernalia, or permit them to ingest controlled substances.
Ultimately, defendant's claim that the statute is vague unless it requires a showing of
a substantial risk of harm is based on two faulty assumptions. First, defendant assumes that
because the term "expose" covers a broad spectrum of conduct, it is necessarily vague. But,
as explained above, a statute is not vague just because it covers a broad spectrum of conduct.
See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,966 (Utah 1989). For example, the Legislature could,
if it chose, simply penalize possessing illegal drugs and paraphernalia in the same home
where children are present, whether or not the children were "exposed to" or were even
aware that drugs were present. The fact that such a statute would catch in its net a broad
spectrum of behavior would not render the statute unconstitutionally vague, because it would
impart "fair notice" that possession of contraband in a home where children were present
was strictly prohibited. See id. Indeed, our legislature has already seen fit to enhance drug
offenses whenever they occur within a 1000 feet of places where children are likely to be
found—schools, parks, churches, and day care centers. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)
(West 2004). This enhancement applies whether or not children are actually present at the
time of the offense, whether they are actually aware of the drugs, or, indeed, whether the
drugs, in fact, present a substantial risk of harm.
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Defendant's second faulty assumption is that mere exposure to illegal drugs or
paraphernalia or ingesting drugs through breast milk do not create a risk of harm. But, as
stated, the Legislature has already determined—as evidenced by the statute's plain language
and legislative history—that exposure alone does create a serious risk of harm for children.
This legislative determination is not without support. According to a recent study by the
National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, "[c]hildren of
illicit drug abusers are likelier than children of non-drug abusers to demonstrate immature,
impulsive or irresponsible behavior, to have lower IQ scores, more absences from school and
to have behavioral problems, depression and anxiety—all signs of risk for substance abuse."
CASA White Paper, Family Matters: Substance Abuse and The American Family, The
National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University 12 (March
2005), available at http://www.casacolumbia.org.

"Children of drug abusing parents,

particularly drug-abusing mothers, are [also] more likely to be disobedient, aggressive,
withdrawn and detached. These children also tend to have fewer friends, lower confidence
in their ability to make friends and a greater likelihood of being avoided by their peers." Id.
According to this study, these children are also at a heightened risk of being abused or
neglected. Id. at 20.
In any event, the exposure here is much more direct than allowing children to see or
live among illegal drugs and paraphernalia. Here, the exposure came from defendant
subjecting her baby to illegal drugs through her breast milk. A reasonably intelligent person
would be on notice that the statute prohibits this.
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In short, exposing a child to illegal drugs and paraphernalia, either through breast-milk
or simply making the contraband accessible to the child, creates an inherent risk of harm.
The term "expose to," therefore, is not unconstitutionally vague merely because the statute
does not require a showing of a substantial risk of harm. Rather, the question is whether the
statute would place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that defendant's
conduct—smoking marijuana and breast-feeding her baby—is prohibited.7
4.

Defendant's conduct falls well within the common ordinary meaning of
"exposed to."

As both the magistrate and the district court recognized, defendant's conduct falls
"unmistakably within the statute's purview." Green, 2004 UT 76, \ 52. Indeed, defendant's
conduct of smoking marijuana and breast-feeding her baby is precisely what the child
endangerment statute seeks to prevent. As stated, "expose" means "to lay open," "leave
unprotected," "to make accessible," or to "subject" one to something, such as an influence
defendant's brief posits several hypotheticals in support of her claim that
"expose" can be read so broadly as to allow prosecution for a host of innocent behavior,
such as allowing "a child to be in the room when a television depicts an actor using drugs,
allowing a child to walk by a shop where a pipe is displayed in a window, or taking a
child to a park where people are smoking marijuana." Br. Aplt. 24. As explained above,
defendant may not complain of the vagueness of a statute as applied to the hypothetical
conduct of others. See Green, 2004 UT 76, \ 44. Defendant has not been prosecuted for
the conduct she cites; she has been prosecuted for smoking marijuana and then breastfeeding her baby. Moreover, defendant's examples are not covered by the statute. The
child endangerment statute requires that a person "knowingly or intentionally cause[] or
permit[] a child . . to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a
controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection
(1)." The definition of "drug paraphernalia" only encompasses those items that are
"intended for" use in manufacturing or introducing a controlled substance in to the body.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(l)(d) & § 58-37a-3. Thus, the statute's clear scienter
requirements "mitigates any existing vagueness." Green, 20024 UT 76, \ 49.
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or action. Br. Aplt. 22 (quoting Webster's New WorldDictionary, 4th ed. 501 (4th ed. 2003).
Under that common, dictionary definition, a person of ordinary intelligence would
understand that the statute prohibits defendant's conduct of smoking marijuana and breastfeeding her baby.
C.

"Expose to" is not so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.
Defendant argues that "expose to" is so vague that it encourages arbitrary and

discriminatory enforcement. Br. Aplt. 15-20,28-31. Again, in an as-applied challenge, this
Court "must focus on the particular conduct at hand and not on the possible conduct of
hypothetical parties." Green, 004 UT 76, ^J 51. Thus, the question is whether "law
enforcement officials encountering [defendant's] circumstances would... be left to pursue
their own personal predilections in determining the applicability of Utah's [child
endangerment] statute." Id at ^52. They would not.
Here, the evidence was uncontroverted that defendant smoked marijuana and nursed
her baby. This conduct falls squarely within the plain meaning of the statutory terms "expose
to" or cause "to ingest." Under these circumstances, law enforcement officers would not be
left to decide, in their discretion, "that the statute's provisions should not apply." Id. Indeed,
abusing illegal drugs while nursing a baby is precisely the kind of conduct that the child
endangerment seeks to prevent.

Defendant's vagueness challenge accordingly fails.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE AT PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS SUFFICIENT
TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT
DEFENDANT COMMITTED CHILD ENDANGERMENT WHERE
SHE INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY LEFT MARIJUANA AND
PARAPHERNALIA IN AREAS OF HER HOME THAT WERE
ACCESSIBLE TO, AND IN PLAIN VIEW OF, HER CHILDREN
Defendant argues that even if "exposed to" is construed broadly, the State "did not
establish probable cause to believe that [she] intentionally or knowingly allowed her infant
'to be exposed to' or ingest marijuana." Br. Aplt. 37. As shown below, however, the
evidence at preliminary hearing was more than sufficient to give rise to a reasonable belief
that defendant permitted her baby to be exposed to or to ingest marijuana.
Bindover standard. "To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show
'probable cause' at a preliminary hearing by 'presenting] sufficient evidence to establish that
the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it.5" State v.
Clark, 2001 UT 9, \ 10, 20 P.3d 300 (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah
1995) (additional internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also State v. Talbot,
972 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1998). Thus, "to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution
must... produce believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." Clark, 2001
UT 9, Tf 15 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause for a
bindover is low—the same as that for obtaining an arrest warrant. Id. at \ 16. Under both
standards, the prosecution must only present "sufficient evidence to support a reasonable
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belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." Id.
(Emphasis added).
In determining whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief that defendant
committed each element of the charged offense, "[t]he magistrate must view all the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the prosecution." Id at | 10 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alteration in original). See also State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, f 3, 26 P.3d 223
(magistrate must "resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution").
"[W]hen faced with conflicting evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh the
evidence . . . but must leave those tasks to the fact finder at trial." Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 10
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, when the evidence gives rise to
alternative reasonable inferences, the magistrate must choose those inferences that support
the State's case. See id. at *[} 20 (although preliminary hearing evidence gave rise to two
alternate inferences - one suggesting innocence and the other guilt - viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the State, evidence supported probable cause); see also
Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, \ 20 ("Although defendants' characterizations of the facts may also
be plausibly inferred from the evidence, there are clearly factual issues that must be resolved
at trial, and the facts do not negate the reasonable inferences presented by the State").
This case. The prosecution here was required to present sufficient credible evidence
to support a reasonable belief that defendant "knowingly or intentionally cause[d] or
permitted]" her baby "to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a
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controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection
(1)." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2). The prosecution did so.
Defendant admitted using marijuana on January 1, 2004 and January 9, 2004. R58.
Two weeks later, on January 20, a DCFS worker saw defendant breast-feeding her then fourmonth-old baby. R56-58. The DCFS worker told defendant "about the dangers of using and
how marijuana and any other drugs go through the breast milk to the child." R5 8. Defendant
claimed she did not know that and promised that she would stop using drugs. R59-60.
Both the magistrate and the district court drew the reasonable inference that if
defendant was breast-feeding her baby on January 20, she also breast-fed her baby on the
days she smoked marijuana two to three weeks earlier. R.67, 165, 168. Contrary to
defendant's suggestion, it is not reasonable to believe that defendant abstained from breastfeeding her baby between January 1 and 9 and again between January 9 and 20. Br. Aplt. 4243.
With respect to defendant's intent, both the magistrate and the district court
acknowledged that defendant had told the caseworker that she did not know that marijuana
would pass through her breast milk. Both courts recognized, however, that a competing
inference—that defendant was not being truthful—could be drawn and that defendant was
aware that what she ingested would also be ingested by her baby through her breast milk.
R168; R67. Both courts properly resolved the conflicting inferences in favor of the State.
Rl 68; R66-67. See Clark, 2001 UT 9,120 (although preliminary hearing evidence gave rise
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to two alternate inferences - one suggesting innocence and the other guilt - viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, evidence supported probable cause) .
Defendant argues that the caseworker's testimony was insufficient to establish that
marijuana can be transmitted through breast milk because the worker was not qualified as an
expert witness. Br. Aplt. 44-45. This Court should not address this claim because defendant
did not object to the caseworker's testimony at preliminary hearing, nor did she object to the
magistrate relying on that testimony to find probable cause. R5 8,60. Defendant waited until
her motion to quash before raising this issue, but by then it was too late for the prosecution
to cure any claimed foundational defect. Rl 80:3-4.
In any event, the record does not support defendant's claim that the caseworker was
not qualified to testify whether marijuana can be transmitted through breast milk. Rather,
the record is silent on that point. It is likely that the DCFS caseworker, who was charged
with protecting children, in fact was qualified through her education and experience to testify
regarding this matter. See Utah R. Evid. 702; Patey v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, f 17, 977 P.2d
1193 ("A person may be qualified to testify as an expert by virtue of experience and training;
formal education is not necessarily required"). See also Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329,
1337 (Utah 1993) ("formal training or education is not a prerequisite to giving expert
opinion, and a witness may qualify as an expert by virtue of his experience or training")
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). No foundation for the caseworker's
experience or knowledge was laid, however, because defendant did not object.
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The

magistrate, therefore, was completely justified in accepting the caseworker's testimony for
purposes of determining probable cause.
In sum, while perhaps not enough to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the
preliminary hearing testimony, along with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom,
was sufficient to give rise to a reasonable belief that defendant knowingly or intentionally
caused her child to ingest or to be exposed to a controlled substance.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks the Court to affirm the district
court's denial of defendant's motion to quash the bindover.
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The above matter came before the Court for oral argument on Becky Draper's
(Defendant) motion to quash bindover / declare Utah Code § 76-5-112.5 unconstitutional on
September 13, 2004. Lana Taylor appeared on behalf of the State of Utah and Shannon Romero
appeared on behalf of the Defendant. The Court took the matter under advisement. Having
reviewed the file and having researched the law pertaining to the issue, the Court DENIES the
Defendant's motion to quash / declare Utah Code § 76-5-112 5 unconstitutional.
BACKGROUND
1

On January 9, 2004, Salt Lake County Detective John Wester (Wester) executed a search
warrant at Defendant's residence, located at 9642 South Garnet Drive, Salt Lake County

2

At the time Wester executed the warrant, the Defendant was present with her 4 month old
child.

3

During execution of the warrant, Wester discovered individually packaged marijuana and
packing material for marijuana distribution, e.g., scales, money, a pay/owe sheet, bongs

and pipes. All of these items, except for the money, was found in the basement.
4

Defendant stated that her husband, Jimmy Draper, had been selling marijuana for about
one and a half years.

5

The items tested positive for marijuana by the State Crime Lab.

6

Karen Barnes (Barnes), a child protective services investigator for the Division of Child
and Family Services, received a referral concerning allegations of child endangerment.

7

Barnes made an unannounced visit to Defendant's residence on January 20, 2004.
Defendant admitted to Barnes that she had smoked marijuana on New Years Eve and on
the day Wester executed the search warrant.

8

While Barnes was interviewing the Defendant, the Defendant began breast feeding her
child. At that point, Barnes discussed the dangers of using marijuana and how marijuana
and any other drugs go through the breast milk to the child. The Defendant was not
aware that marijuana remains in a person's system or that it would go through the breast
milk to the child. The Defendant indicated that she would not use drugs anymore.

9

Barnes did not have the Defendant or the child tested for drugs.

10

On February 9, 2004, Defendant was charged with endangerment of child or elder adult, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code § 76-5-112 5.

11

On May 3, 2004, the Court bound over for trial concluding that there was sufficient
evidence to find probable cause to believe that Defendant's child was endangered and that
Defendant committed the crime.

12

Thereafter, the Defendant filed the present motion to quash / declare Utah Code § 76-5112.5 unconstitutional challenging both (1) the constitutionality of the endangerment of
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child or elder adult statute, § 76-5-112 5 and (2) the quantum of proof produced by the
State at the preliminary hearing that the Defendant committed the crime of endangerment
of a child.
I
VAGUENESS
In deciding the constitutionality of a statute, the court must first analyze the plain
language of the statute. State v. Macguire, 2004 UT 4,1(15, 84 P.3d 1171, 1175. "We need not
look beyond the plain language unless we find some ambiguity in it." Id at 1J15 {citing Utah Sch.
Bds. Ass'n v. State Bd OfEduc, 2001 UT 2,1J13, 17 P.3d 1125).
Section 76-5-112.5(2) provides:
Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who knowingly
or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest
or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or
drug paraphernalia as defined in subsection (1), is guilty of a felony of the third
degree.
M

A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question of law. . .. When addressing

such a challenge, this court presumes that the statute is valid, and we resolve any reasonable
doubts in favor of constitutionality." State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, ^5, 31 P 3d 547.
"Additionally, legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional, and those who challenge
a statute or ordinance as unconstitutional bear the burden of demonstrating its
unconstitutionality." State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ^|42 (Internal quotation marks omitted).
"[VJagueness questions are essentially procedural due process issues, i e., whether the
statute adequately notices the proscribed conduct." Id at ^J43. Where a statute "implicates no
constitutionally protected conduct, a court will uphold a facial vagueness challenge only if the
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[statute] is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." State v. Macguire, supra, 2004 UT at
1J12 (quoting Village of Hoffman Estate v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
494-95 (1982).
A statute that is clear as applied to a particular complainant cannot be considered
impermissibly vague in all of its applications and thus will necessarily survive a
facial vagueness challenge. . . . In order to establish that the complained of
provisions are impermissibly vague, a defendant must demonstrate either (1) that
the statutes do not provide the kind of notice that enables ordinary people to
understand what conduct [is prohibited], or (2) that the statutes encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Id at ^[13 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Green, supra,
2004 UT at ftf .
"If a statute is sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is
prohibited, it is not unconstitutionally vague." Id. at ^[14. "[A] defendant who engages in some
conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the
conduct of others." State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App. 326, \AA (Internal quotation marks omitted).
n

[V]agueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms

must be examined in light of the facts at hand.. . . Additionally, a court should examine the
complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law when a
challenged statute implicates no constitutionally protected conduct." State v. Green, supra, 2004
UT at ^44 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted).
Utah courts have upheld statutes with undefined terms that were challenged as
unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah \9%\)(upheld
statute where "gross deviation" was undefined); State v. Ki'ueger, 1999 UT App. 54, ^[14, 975
P.2d 489, 496 (Utah App. \999)(upheld statute where "delinquent" was undefined); Salt Lake
City v. Lopez, 935 P 2d 1259, 1265 (Utah App \991)(upheld statute where "emotional distress"
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was undefined).
In State v. Owens, supra, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the statute legitimately
proscribed a broad spectrum of conduct and the undefined term had a common sense meaning.
638P.2dat 1184.
In State v. Krueger, supra, the Court of Appeals of Utah relied upon the widespread
usage of the terms "delinquency" and "contributing to the delinquency" of a minor to give clear
and understandable meaning to those terms of the statute. State v. Krueger, supra, 1999 UT
App. at 1fl4. The Court of Appeals evaluated the connotation of those terms and whether such
connotations were "sufficiently well known that persons of ordinary intelligence and judgment
who desire to do so would have no difficulty in governing their conduct by the statute." Id. at

In Salt Lake City v. Lopez, supra, the Court of Appeals of Utah relied upon the statute's
specific intent requirement and stated that "a specific intent requirement significantly vitiates any
claim that its purported vagueness could mislead a person of common intelligence into
misunderstanding what is prohibited." Salt Lake City v. Lopez, supra, 935 P.2d at 1265.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals examined the complainant's conduct before analyzing other
hypothetical applications of the law to determine whether the statute was unconstitutionally
applied to the defendant. Id. The Court of Appeals concluded that given the defendant's
knowledge and conduct, he could not claim that the statute was vague as applied to him, "let
alone that the statute is totally invalid and incapable of any valid application." Id
When a term is undefined, the term's ordinary and accepted meaning is often taken from
the dictionary. See, e.g., Provo City v. Cannon, 1999 UT App. 344, \U, 994 P.2d 206 (defining
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"peril" with Webster's Dictionary); State v. Serpente, 768 P.2d 994, 996 (Utah App.
\9%9)(defining "expose" with Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary).
A
Section 76-5-112 5(2) is presumed to be constitutional, therefore, Defendant bears a
heavy burden of demonstrating its unconstitutionality. The Court concludes that Defendant fails
to carry her heavy burden. Section 76-5-112.5(2) clearly gives notice that ordinary people of
intelligence and judgment who desire to do so would have no difficulty in governing their
conduct by the statute. Ordinary people of intelligence and judgment reading § 76-5-112.5(2)
would understand that if a person knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder
adult to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance,
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia they are guilty of a third degree felony.
There is no constitutional right to causing or permitting a child to be exposed to or have
contact with a controlled substance, a chemical substance or drug paraphernalia, therefore,
Defendant's facial vagueness challenge will succeed only if the statute is "impermissibly vague
in all of its applications." State v. Macguire, supra, 2004 UT at ^[12.
The Defendant contends that the term "exposed" is undefined and therefore, does not
provide a person of reasonable intelligence with enough detail to know what type of conduct is
prohibited. The Defendant argues that there is no way of knowing what is meant by the term
"exposed." The Court does not agree.
The term "exposed" needs no definition to be constitutional. By not defining the term
"exposed" the legislature did not "impermissibly delegate basic policy matters to judges and
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis" as argued by the Defendant. Rather, the
MEMORANDUM DECISION

6

000164

legislature allows the fact finder to evaluate the facts of a case and apply the term "exposed"
using the common sense or ordinary meaning of the term. "Expose" as defined by Webster's is:
1 a To remove shelter or protection from; b. To lay open, as to something
undesirable or injurious. 2. To subject (e.g., a photographic film) to the action of
light. 3. To make visible . . . 4 a. To make known {e.g., a crime); b To reveal the
guilt or wrongdoing of. 5. To abandon or put out without shelter or food.
Random House Webster's dictionary at 250 (4th Ed. 2001); see also Webster's II* New Riverside
University Dictionary at 452 (1988).
The statute legitimately reaches a broad spectrum of conduct to allow the fact finder to
determine under the specific facts of the case whether the child or elder were "exposed" to "a
controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia." There is no ambiguity in the
statute and since the plain meaning of the statute is clear using the ordinary and accepted
meaning of the term "exposed," the Court need not look to the legislative intent.
Under the facts of this case, the Defendant's residence had packaged marijuana, bongs,
and pipes. Applying the common sense, ordinary and accepted meaning of the term "exposed,"
the marijuana, bongs and pipes lay open or were visible and the child was not protected from
them, therefore, the child was "exposed" to the items Moreover, the intent requirement that the
Defendant "knowingly or intentionally" exposed the child significantly vitiates the impact of not
defining the term "exposed" because a person of common intelligence would understand what is
prohibited.
Furthermore, the Defendant was nursing her child and was an admitted drug user. An
inference that the Defendant was using drugs prior to nursing her child is reasonable. Therefore,
the "ingested" portion of the statute might apply because the Defendant was knowingly and
intentionally breastfeeding her child, who was ingesting the drugs through the breastmilk.
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As applied in this case, Section 76-5-112.5(2) is constitutional, therefore, the statute
cannot be "impermissibly vague in all of its applications" as required to succeed on a vagueness
challenge.
Defendant also argues that § 76-5-112.5(2) encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement because there are not minimal guidelines or circumstances where "exposure" occurs
to guide law enforcement and judges, therefore, they consciously or subconsciously discriminate
against certain classes of individuals.
Although the Court need not address this challenge, because the Court previously decided
that as applied in this case § 76-5-112.5(2) is constitutional, the Court clarifies that § 76-5112.5(2) legitimately proscribes a broad spectrum of conduct. To attempt to define guidelines or
circumstances would be arbitrary. See, e.g., State v. Owens, supra, 638 P.2d at 1184-85. As
written, § 76-5-112.5(2) avoids arbitrarily narrowing the proscribed conduct and allows the fact
finder to determine whether under the circumstances the child or elder person was "exposed" to
"a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia" applying the common sense,
ordinary and accepted meaning of the term "exposed."
B
Defendant also argues that § 76-5-112.5(2) is unconstitutionally vague because the statute
appears to criminalize potential harm rather than actual harm. Specifically, Defendant argues
that the mere possibility or risk of "exposure" is sufficient to support the charge, which is
unconstitutional and cites several non-binding cases. The Court is not persuaded.
Based upon the common sense or ordinary meaning of the term "exposed" as stated
above, a person may decide under the circumstances whether the child or elder adult was
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"exposed" to the prohibited items. The Court is not inclined to believe that the only harm is
actual inhalation, ingesting or contact with because the Legislature did include the term
"exposed," which under the general ordinary meaning of the word includes "to lay open," or
"make visible," or "to remove shelter or protection from." These definitions are less than actual
inhalation, ingestion or contact with, but are within the ordinary meaning of "exposed."
Furthermore, just because a child or elder adult does not inhale, ingest or have contact with the
prohibited items does not mean that they are not harmed.

n
PROBABLE CAUSE
Alternatively, the Defendant argues that the State failed to demonstrate probable cause to
believe the Defendant committed the offense of child endangerment. The Court does not agree.
The "quantum of evidence necessary to support a bindover" is the same as that required
for issuance of an arrest warrant: "[T]he prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a
reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." State
v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ 16. The Court outlined the magistrate's role, summarizing the
conclusions of a number of prior cases:
To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show probable cause at a
preliminary hearing by presenting sufficient evidence to establish that the crime
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it. At this
stage of the proceeding, the evidence required [to show probable cause] . . . is
relatively low because the prosecution's case will only get stronger as the
investigation continues. Accordingly, when faced with conflicting evidence, the
magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence . . . but must leave those tasks to the
fact finder at trial. Instead, the magistrate must view all evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the prosecution. Yet, the magistrate's role in this process, while limited, is not
that of a rubber stamp for the prosecution . . . . Even with this limited role, the
magistrate must attempt to ensure that all groundless and improvident
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prosecutions are ferreted out no later than the preliminary.
Id at ^ 10 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted; interpolation by the Court;
emphasis added). The Clark court held "that to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution
must still produce believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." Id (Internal
quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Schroyer, 44 P.3d 730, 732 (Utah 2002); State v.
Robinson, 63 P.3d 105, 106 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).
Section 76-5-112.5(2) provides:
Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who knowingly
or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest
or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or
drug paraphernalia as defined in subsection (1), is guilty of a felony of the third
degree.
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the State and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the State's favor, the Court concludes that the State met its burden to bindover to
show a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it.
As stated above, supra LA., the Defendant was nursing her child and was an admitted drug user.
A reasonable inference that the Defendant was using drugs prior to nursing her child can be
made, therefore, the "ingested" portion of the statute may apply. Although there was testimony
that the Defendant did not know that the drugs in her system and would pass to her child when
she was nursing, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the State and all
reasonable inferences drawn in the State's favor. The Court concludes that there was enough
evidence at the preliminary hearing to show that Defendant knowingly or intentionally caused
her child to ingest or be exposed to a controlled substance, chemical substance or drug
paraphernalia.
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The Court DENIES Defendant's motion to quash bindover / declare Utah Code § 76-5112.5 unconstitutional.
Dated thfrgffl&y of^ffllfeber, 2004.
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ADDENDUM B
Senate Floor Debates on 2002 Amendment
to Child Endangerment Statute

Senate Debate on HB 125
March 1, 2002
54th Leg. General Session, Day 40 Tape 46
Mr. President: Let's next go to house bill 125
: House bill 125 endangerment of child or elder person with controlled substance or
precursor, by representative (inaudible) Senator Joe Lander.
Mr. President: Senator Julander.
Senator Julander: There were two over sights dealing in the section dealing with a child
or elder adult in 76-5-112.5. We will correct those two problems with this bill. The first
problem is that the section contains an awkward (inaudible) requirement. Obviously
we've already determined that controlled substances are risky to an individual's health.
The current language unintentionally requires a prosecutor to present specific evidence to
show that controlled substances are dangerous. This is not only expensive it's rather
ridiculous. The other oversight in this section is that it contains no exceptions for drugs,
which are administered in accordance with a prescription from a physician; this bill also
fixes that problem. This bill was requested by the State Wide Association of Prosecutors
and supported by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice and (inaudible)
Commission, the Law Enforcement Legislative Committee, and the Utah Substance
Abuse Anti-Violence Counsel. It passed unanimously in all committees and on the house
floor.
Mr. President: Senator Valentine?
Senator Valentine: Thank you Mr. President. This bill (inaudible).
Senator Julander: I can't hear him.
Mr. President: Try him again; let's see if it'll turn on (inaudible) again. Oh that's better.
Senator Valentine: I don't think, that it was an oversight. Specifically lines 27, 28, and
29,1 remember the debate on this, and I remember that this was one of the elements of a
different crime. So that we have a different crime, of being exposed in addition to the
possession or the obvious crime of having the drug paraphernalia, the drugs themselves,
um, of having um, a meth. Lab, but the additional crime in addition to the, the underlying
crime was this exposure, and so by deleting out 27, 28, and 29 you now make it an
automatic crime. So that if the drug paraphernalia is in the same house someplace as the
child, but all of the sudden now you have two crimes that have been committed. And we
talked about that very thing, and we argued back and forth about that and we finally
decided that we wanted to have that felony crime, that enhanced crime there when you
had to prove one additional element, and the element was, the very things you're
dropping out. Can you tell me now why we will have two crimes for one action, by
dropping that out? Why that's good policy?

1

Senator Julander: (There's still two crimes) I, if I understand your question, there's still
two crimes, but you don't. But, but if you look at line 17, it already defines the chemical
substance.
Senator Valentine: Yea, that's the chemical substance, but if it's someplace in the
dwelling, maybe even totally removed from where the children can get to, you're saying
now it's a second crime because you've dropped out, you make it an automatic second
crime. You dropped out the exposure provision, which was the provision that we
negotiated to put in as the second element of the crime.
Senator Julander: But if you, uh if they have to be exposed to it if you look in 33-32 they
have to exposed to it or ingest it.
Senator Valentine: But aren't you dropping out in the previous lines the exposure? Cause
you're saying unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who
knowingly or intentionally cause or permits a child or elder adult to be, and then you
have the language you're dropping out, which is the 'at risk' language. Isn't that
dropping out the exposure?
Senator Julander: But look on 29 it's exposed to, to ingest or inhale.
Senator Valentine: Obviously if you're dealing drugs to a kid, then that one is covered by
three.
Senator Julander: Excuse me?
Senator Valentine: If you're dealing drugs to a child then that one is covered by
paragraph three, and that's very obvious. I mean, and that should be an enhanced penalty.
It's just the exposure of it being in the premises that I'm worried about. (Murmurs) See
one of the problems is that if you have it just to the list of precursors on line 17 as you
originally talked about, there are some things on those list of precursors that are in a lot of
houses, probably your house. I could probably find some of those items; uh for example,
uh some of those items in smaller quantities are in your medicine cabinet. But you need
to be able to show exposure to those items, so that you cannot have a crime. I mean, that
bothers me that you'd have a crime just because it's in the house. Let me give you one
example, ephedrine, that in over the counter medications for decongestant, that's
probably in medicine cabinet some place. Does that mean you committed a crime
because you're grandchildren are in the same house as you are? That's wh, that's what's
worrying me.
Mr. President: Senator Julander?
Senator Julander: I really think this is a policy question, and I would like to get more
information, and get to you and circle the bill at the proper time.
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Mr. President: Thank you I was going to suggest that you circle it for now, and then we'll
get back to it.
Senator Lander: I will get back with you; I would like to circle the bill.
Senator Valentine: And senator thank you very much, I'm sorry these things are coming
up pretty fast and I didn't get to talk to you in advance.
Senator Lander: That's okay. That's okay; we'll clear it up.
Senator Valentine: Thank you.
Mr. President: The motion is to circle the bill, all in favor say aye.
Senate: Aye
Mr. President: Opposed? Motion passes. Senator Steel.
Senator Steel: Thank you Mr. President.
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Senate Debate on HB 125
March 4, 2002
th
54 Leg. General Session, Day 43 Tape 49
Mr. President: Senator Julander. I'm sorry I didn't give you a mic.
Senator Julander: We discussed this bill on Friday, and Senator Valentine raised some
questions and had some amendments, at this time I would yield to Senator Valentine.
Mr. President: Yes, Senator Valentine I'm sorry, I'm day dreaming up here.
Senator Valentine: There's someplace here that I had some amendments on this messy
desk. They were passed out earlier, I. I'm not quite sure where they are, have we got
those? Mr. President I move the amendments, and amendment number one under my
name did it March 1st, 2002. Let me explain those amendments, I raised some issues last
time about incidental contact with precursors with the, the elements and substances that
are in precursors. And uh, after going back and talking with some of our prosecutors we
found we did have a problem indeed, the problem is that, uh there has to be a sufficient
amount intended to be used in the manufacturing of a controlled substance, and then the
intent would then be presumed by the elements that were in the present bill. But that's
what the amendment does, it uh, makes it so that the problems that I raised last time
would not therefore be in the bill. That's my motion to amend.
Mr. President: Questions on the motion to amend? All in favor of the amendment say
aye.
Senate: Aye
Mr. President: Opposed? Motion passes; the bill as before us is amended. Senator Jewel
Julander?
Senator Julander: Thank you, uh I don't remember having any other questions, but at this
time I would take any other question if there are any regarding this piece of legislation.
Mr. President: Any questions on this legislation? See none Senator.
Senator Julander: I call for the vote that we, uh, under the suspension of the rules
(inaudible). That we move to the third calendar.
Mr. President: Motion is shall House Bill 123 be read for the third time, roll call vote.
Roll call vote is done, (inaudible).
Mr. President: Senator Bramble?
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Senator Bramble: I apologize I've been having trouble getting my computer up, but I vote
I on this. This is a bill that I spoke with the attorney that drafted it, and we resolved the
issues I'd misunderstood that bill. So I do vote aye on it.
: Hickman
Mr. President: No there's nobody up there Senator Hickman.
: Senator Hickman?
Mr. President: That wasn't a voice from heaven, that's the roll call.
Senator Hickman: Aye.
Roll call finishes.
Mr. President: I'm waiting for a voicefromheaven like Senator Hickman, to give me an
indication. Alright, House Bill 125, received 25 aye votes, no nay votes, four being
absent passes to the third (inaudible) calendar. We'll now go to House Bill 206.
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